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Antagonism and the Formation of the Nationalist Imaginary  
 In this paper I assess the conditions which allowed for the emergence of what I call 
the 'nationalist imaginary' in the Israeli-Occupied Territories and Palestinian diaspora and in 
the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (particularly in the region now called Serbia). 
I treat the nationalist imaginary as a specific modality of "imagined community" (Anderson 
1991), seeing it as emerging when a group of people comes to conceive of itself as a 'we' 
through the process of mobilizing against forces its members recognize as threatening their 
individual and collective survivals. Their shared perception that their being is threatened by 
an aggressive outside agency - which I, following Laclau and Mouffe, call an "antagonism" 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 93ff) - impels them to join in the project of forming a nation state 
to protect them from that menacing other. In analysing the formations of nationalist 
identities in Palestine and in what we now term 'Former Yugoslavia' I intend to show the 
part played by antagonism in constituting oppositional nationalist movements.  
 At the heart of this paper is the role 'constitutive violence' plays in identity formation. 
I show, through analysing the emergence of nationalist imaginaries, that violence is not 
simply a device nationalists of certain persuasions take up strategically in pursuit of ends (cf. 
Adam 1990), but something that plays a constitutive role in the formation of all nationalisms 
(see Bowman 2001b). The violence which engenders nationalism is not the violence the 
imagined community of the future nation turns against its 'enemies', but the violence 
members of that not-yet-existent nation perceive as inflicted upon them by others who make 
it impossible for them to exist in anything other than an autonomous state. An antagonism, 
  
rather than threatening a pre-existing and self-conscious entity, brings the community it 
threatens into being through that threat, and gives shape and identity to what it threatens 
through placing it at risk. Perceptions of a violence afflicting a diverse range of persons give 
rise to a concept of a 'national enemy' and, through that concept, to the idea of solidarity 
with those whom that enemy opposes. 
BOWMAN - CONSTITUTIVE VIOLENC 
 I here investigate two processes of identity redefinition. I first look into the way the 
Palestinian people came into being as a result of the project of nation formation the Zionist 
movement successfully carried out on the land the Palestinians had occupied long before they 
thought of themselves as 'Palestinians'. Then I examine the way Yugoslavs came to see 
themselves not as citizens within an existent federal state but as members of opposed national 
communities unnaturally forced to co-exist under the tyranny of an imposed union.  In both 
cases I stress that nationalism is an historical construct which emerges in certain conditions 
through individual and group reformulations of relations to social fields. Awareness of the 
catalytic role of perceptions of antagonism can help us to understand when (and where) 
nationalist movements arise and why they do not find expression at other times (or places).  
 Anthony Smith stresses the need for 'a sense of solidarity' to effect the bonding 
distinguishing an ethnie 'for itself' (an ethnic community emerging into self-interested 
national consciousness) from an ethnie 'in itself' (an "ethnic category" recognisable by outside 
observers but within which people are "largely unaware of their ethnic ties" [Smith 1988: 9]):  
"the civic concept of a modern nation with its common territory, economy, 
citizenship and mass educational culture often lacks or omits the solidarity 
and homogeneity stressed by an ethnic concept; the modern nation, to 
become truly a 'nation', requires the unifying myths, symbols and memories 
of pre-modern ethnie" (Smith 1988: 11). 
  
While it is undoubtedly true that 'myths, symbols and memories' circulate with increasing 
velocity as national consciousness develops, it is not clear whether these are causes or 
consequences of that growing chauvinism. Myths and symbols of ethnic endurance are 
certainly used by nationalist intellectuals and politicians to legitimate ethnic mobilization 
but, as John Breuilly notes, "it is very difficult to correlate their degree of success with the 
'objective' importance of such myths and symbols" (Breuilly 1996: 1513). Not only are these 
mythic legitimations ofttimes falsehoods or fabrications, but they can - even when 'true' - 
seem somehow tangential or extraneous to the power (or lack thereof) of the national drive.  
This paper will suggest that it is a people's perception of an existence-threatening force – an 
antagonism – which impels nationalist activity which may involve, as an adjunct to the 
struggle to overcome that antagonism, the promotion of a corpus of ethnic myths. Without, 
however, the mobilizing disturbance of an antagonism people are unlikely to respond to the 
national agendas of politicians and intellectuals with the commitment Kamenka (1973: 15) 
sees as distinguishing 'national' from 'nationalist' identity; in the absence of a threat to what 
they perceive as their being people are likely, at best, to pledge erratic allegiance to a 
culturalist programme (see, for instance, Handler 1988). 
 In stressing the role perceptions of the violence of an other play in constituting 
nationalist identity, I also criticize the material determinism of nation theorists such as 
Ernest Gellner (1983) and Benedict Anderson (1991: 37-46) who argue that the emergence of 
a will to nationhood effectively reflects economic developments forced by modernisation. 
Although each offers intriguing elaborations of the processes whereby economic processes 
produce mental structures, neither pushes significantly beyond Lenin's analysis of nation 
formation in his 1914 essay "The Rights of Nations to Self-Determination" where he contends 
that "for the complete victory of commodity production, the bourgeoisie must capture the 
  
home market, and there must be politically united territories whose population speak a 
single language, with all obstacles to the development of that language and to its 
consolidation in literature eliminated" (Lenin 1963: 598). One must ask 'when' and 'why' (if 
at all) specifically nationalist drives emerge in the midst of such homogenizing processes. 
Prior to the articulations of Palestinian, Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian nationalisms, 
Mandate Palestine and pre-dissolution Yugoslavia were sufficiently modernised - in terms 
of the development of trans-regional economies and a print culture - to support nationalist 
consciousnesses . Nonetheless, these nationalist movements did not emerge with popular 
backing until tensions and incompatibilities between groups occupying those territories 
were interpreted in ways which split the field of sociality into domains of the nation and its 
enemy. Palestinians, after the creation of the state of Israel drove a majority of them into 
diaspora, rarely became Arab nationalists despite sharing the Arabic language and the 
Arabic press with other Arabic-reading communities. They became anti-Zionists because 
they recognised the role of Israel and its precursors in dispossessing them. Serbs and Croats 
were not united in imagined community by their mutual use of Serbo-Croatian and their 
shared access to a Yugoslav press; despite (and through) that shared medium they came to 
conceive of each other as blood enemies who had to wage war for the defence of their 
respective national identities. In each instance, stories of violence carried through those 
media enabled members of the respective groups to recognise in those scenarios violences 
like those they suffered and enemies like those who tormented them. While the 
development of modes of communication enabling dispersed members of a community to 
conceive of others sharing with them a common language and a common territory is an 
essential prerequisite of being able to imagine an extended community, this is not in itself 
enough to promulgate nationalist consciousness. For nationalism to emerge one had not 
  
only to see one's identity as integrally linked with that of a wider community but also had to 
sense that that community - and the identity with which it provided oneself - were at risk.  
 Identity, in other words, emerges from identification. The nationalist imaginary 
reifies as 'the nation' the imagined collectivity of all those who suffer 'the same' violence at 
the hands of a common enemy. It presents the world as divided between the good, but 
threatened, community of an 'us' and the evil community of a 'them', existing solely to 
destroy that 'us'. The nationalist imaginary draws together the multiplex strands of violence, 
risk and threat afflicting people's everyday lives to reveal at their origins a unitary 
antagonist. Although there tends, in the nationalist articulations discussed below, to be 
utopic futures imagined in which all of the other's antagonism will have been elided, the 
primary emphasis of the nationalist imaginary is on the contemporary struggle to expel or 
extinguish the sources of constitutive violence. It is a logic of mobilisation.  
 In the following pages I will show when and how popular movements were 
variously able to constitute concepts of communal identity around imaginings of 
antagonistic others in Palestine and Former Yugoslavia. My use of these two examples 
reflects my fieldwork experiences during which I observed the build up to and outbreak of 
initial nationalist uprisings (see Bowman 1986, 1987, 1990, 1993a, 2001a). Those eruptions 
were, however, the culminations of long sequences of historical transformations and 
reformulations of identity, and, to present the argument I here intend, it is important to 
relate and analyse processes extending well beyond the ethnographic moment. I will, where 
appropriate, refer to my, and others', field research, but for the most part my sources and my 
perspective are historical and text-based. 
 
The Articulation of a Palestinian National Movement (1881-1994) 
  
 Rashid Khalidi, in Palestinian Identity: the Construction of Modern National 
Consciousness, sidesteps the issue of the late emergence of an explicity 'Palestinian' identity 
by arguing that Palestinians all along knew who they were:  
"several overlapping senses of identity have been operating in the way the 
Palestinians have come to define themselves as a people, senses that have not 
necessarily been contradictory for the Palestinians themselves, but can be 
misunderstood or misinterpreted by others" (Khalidi 1997: 19). 
Issam Nassar has, however, recently problematised what Khalidi suggests is a 
straightforward process of a nation 'making itself visible' by stressing that not only did 
"Zionist denial" (Nassar 2002: 25) make it difficult to talk of Palestinian national identity but 
also that its articulation was impeded by "internal contradictions inside the Palestinian 
discourse itself, partly because the discourse emerged out of historical processes that were 
often intended precisely to prevent its emergence" (Ibid). Nassar here implies that assertions 
of identity are not only made against others' alternative formulations but also that those 
assertions are often blocked or confused by being made in terms of alternative, often 
antagonistic, formulations.  
 *** 
 In the early years of the twentieth century, there were neither 'Palestinians' nor a 
Palestinian national movement. This was not because Arabs only emigrated into Palestine 
from surrounding countries after 1920 to take advantage of economic opportunities opened 
by Zionist settlement (Peters 1984)ii but because the indigenous occupants of the region the 
British conquered in 1917 and named Palestine had no conception of themselves as a single 
community. The Ottoman millet system had functioned by juridically dividing the 
population into autonomous religious enclaves which, while providing occupants with legal 
  
identity and social support (see Asali 1989: 206, Abu-Jaber 1967 and Cohen and Lewis 1978), 
"precluded concern for, or even interest in, any people but those of one's own religious 
community" (Betts 1975: 112). Qays and Yaman affiliationsiiidivided the landscape into 
distinct and ofttimes feuding units: 
 "the banners of Qays and Yaman united Muslims and Christians as well as 
Bedouin, town dwellers, and fellahin (peasants). But they divided clans, 
villages, and districts in the interests of competing local lords" (Schölch 1993: 
194). 
Urban families and clans perceived friends and enemies in terms not only of sectarian 
affiliation or alliances in long-running feuds but also of the heated debate between Ottoman 
loyalists and Arab nationalists (see Muslih 1988: 47-54 and 58-68, Lesch 1979: 23-74, 
Antonius 1938: 79-148 and Hourani 1991: 258-262). The multiplicity of available categories of 
identity served to articulate the disparate social and economic interests of relatively 
autonomous groups and thereby ensured that the community of 'Palestinians' neither 
functioned as nor could recognise 'itself' as a community.  
 The development of a sense of a specific land, and of a people whose identity 
devolved from their residence within its borders, needed a powerful impetus to free itself 
from the domains of familial, sectarian, regional and economic identities and become 
amenable to integration within a national discourse. That impetus was provided by the 
movement of substantial numbers of Jewish immigrants into the region following intense 
anti-Semitic persecutions in Russia (1881-1882). Jewish immigration changed the face of the 
land; between 1881 and 1922 the Jewish population more than tripled (rising from 24,000 to 
nearly 84,000) and immense tracts of land were bought up by the Jewish colonies, often from 
absentee Arab landlords (Aaronsohn 1983, Abu-Lughod 1971 and Ruedy 1971). The setters' 
  
programmatic insistence on avodah ivrit (Hebrew labour) meant Jewish property could not 
be worked by non-Jews (see Shafir 1996: 45-90) and "settlers refused to let neighboring 
villagers and bedouin tribes continue customary pasture rights on their lands" (Lesch 1979: 
28). As early as 1886 villagers of al-Yahudiyya, disputing grazing rights, attacked the Jewish 
colony at Petah Tikva (Muslih 1988: 71-72) and other clashes broke out between peasants 
and settlers in Tiberias (1901-1902) and 'Affula (1911) when local Arabs discovered the land 
they lived on had been sold out from under their feet (Ibid: 72). The Hope Simpson Report 
indicated that by 1930 29.4% of the rural population of the Mandated area was landless 
(cited in Ruedy 1971: 131). Many peasants emigrated to urban slums where there were few 
opportunities for employment. Anti-Jewish rioting frequently broke out in the cities 
throughout the twenties - particularly on occasions when religious festivities generated 
crowds - and these disturbances often spread to the countryside where villagers, incited by 
rumours of Jewish attacks, would take up arms against local Jewish settlements (see Lesch 
1979: 206).  
 Yet while there was a general sense of being threatened by 'the Jews' among the rural 
peasantry and urban lumpenproletariat this perception remained inchoate and situational. 
Similarly the disquiet felt by small merchants and craft producers about the incursion of 
Jewish competitors into their economic domains (Scholch 1989: 243-245) was voiced among 
restricted circles and remained un-politicized. Palestinian elites, which had traditionally 
provided political leadership, also failed to forge a discourse designating Zionism as a 
common threat. Even when individual urban notables recognised the need to resist the 
steady expansion of Zionist settlement and immigration, they articulated that threat in terms 
drawn from earlier enunciations of identity and antagonism, thus re-igniting hostilities 
between themselves and potential allies with whom they had struggled in those terms in the 
  
past. Mandate officials' arguments to Palestinian notables that "the Arabs' position in 
Palestine was not as severely threatened as they had initially feared [and that they should 
therefore]...grasp the available levers of power" (Lesch 1979: 99, see also Porath 1974: 241f) 
served merely to fuel internecine struggles for power and influence between elite families 
(Nashashibi 1990, Shepherd 2000).  
 
 The failure of the urban notables forced the peasantry to express its fears and its will 
to resist 'Jewish' violence in terms drawn from the idiom of its own traditions. In 1929, after 
the political initiatives of the urban leadership had collapsed in a fracas of factionalisms, 
major rioting broke out in Jerusalem when Jewish militants celebrating the Jewish fast of 
Tisha Bav (the destruction of the Temple) on the eve of the Muslim feast of Mawlad al-Nabi 
(the birth of the Prophet Muhammad) asserted claims to the Wailing Wall. The consequent 
riots were legitimated in Islamic terms. Islam, however, provided a banner under which to 
fight not because of a deep investment of peasant subjectivity in religion but because 
religion was the only idiom able to unite a peasantry fragmented by regional, factional, kin 
and clan allegiances:  
"there is no doubt that the idea of national interests - even the idea of nation 
itself - were foreign to the Palestinian peasantry. The very name 'Palestine' 
was new and uncomfortable, as witnessed by the references to 'Southern 
Syria' as an appellation for the country in this and earlier periods. Ties of 
faction, clan and religion remained of greatest importance to the mass of 
Palestinians. Of these, faction, kin and clan ties had no utility as a symbolic 
armature on which to mold an ideology for mass resistance. If anything, they 
were a hindrance....Islam, however, was highly appropriate; faced with a 
  
foreign enemy of two different religions who sought domination over the 
second holiest land of the Faith, Islam provided the cultural categories, in the 
conceptual field of jih∼ d [holy war], to encompass and organize resistance" 
(Johnson 1982: 57, see also Tamari 1982). 
The identity of the peasantry that rose up in 1929 - and later during the bloody Arab Revolt - 
was organised to eradicate the antagonism it experienced as a consequence of British and 
Zionist colonisation: "Palestinian nationalism was essentially nihilist in the sense that it 
contained no concept of the shape of future society but was concerned first and foremost 
with the destruction of European hegemony" (Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, cited in Waines 1971: 
220).  In other words, the first widespread manifestation of what later commentators have 
come to call 'Palestinian nationalism' was neither Palestinian nor nationalist but purely 
oppositional.  
 The Arab Revolt (Kalkas, B. 1971, Swedenburg 1995 and Shepherd 2000: 189-215) 
lacked a coherent programme and a unified leadership and, while lasting more than three 
years, frequently fragmented into local skirmishes against Palestinians on other sides of the 
Qays-Yaman divide. It faced a well-organised enemy; British forces defeated the revolt, 
killing and wounding between 4,007 (Government of Palestine 1946: 34-58) and 19,792 
(Khalidi 1971: 846-849, see also Waines 1971: 234), while destroying rural and urban centres 
of resistance through aerial bombing, collective demolitions, and 'slum clearance' 
programmes. Despite this victory the British, weakened by the Second World War and the 
subsequent anti-British liberation struggle of Zionist irregulars, pulled out of Palestine in 
May 1948. A year of war between Arab and Israeli forces followed resulting, by July of 1949, 
in the new State of Israel occupying 73% of what had been Mandate Palestine (the remaining 
territory - Gaza and the West Bank - was subsequently commandeered by Egypt and Jordan 
  
[see Hilal 1992]). 711,000 (82.6%) of the 861,000 Palestinian Arabs who had lived on the 
territory which became Israel were forced into exile outside its borders (Morris 1987: 
297-298).  
 The nakbah ('catastrophe' in Palestinian Arabic) initiated nearly a decade's surcease in 
the elaboration of Palestinian identity. "Military defeat and the destruction of the fabric of 
their society forced Palestinians to adjust either to varying degrees and forms of 
statelessness or to citizenship in the new Israeli state" (Waines 1971: 207). Underlying this 
was the loss of familiar reference points around which to reconstitute identities. In the 
refugee camps this experience was perhaps most radical; loss of lands and dispersal of 
families and communities left exiles in a virtual limbo. Rosemary Sayigh described the 
experience of refugees in Lebanese camps of exile from any familiar habitus:  
The village - with its special arrangements of houses and orchards, its open 
meeting places, its burial ground, its collective identity - was built into the 
personality of each individual villager to a degree that made separation like 
an obliteration of the self. In describing their first years as refugees, camp 
Palestinians use metaphors like 'death', 'paralysis', 'burial', 'non-existence', 
etc.... (Sayigh 1979: 107).  
Urban Palestinians sought refuge within a network of well-to-do expatriate communities 
scattered throughout the Middle East, Europe and the Americas (see Tamari 1982: 180, 
Lustick 1980: 48, Brand 1988: 1-21 and Gonzalez 1992: 62-76). Palestinians who remained in 
Israel proper experienced radical disruptions of their previous ways of living under a severe 
regime of military control which strove to enforce upon resident Palestinians even more 
extreme forms of factionalization than those which had prevailed before the upsurge of 
anti-colonialist mobilization (Lustick 1980, Cohen 1965, Asad 1975 and Morris 1987). As a 
  
result of these diverse experiences communities in the various milieu of Palestinian life 
began to reconstitute themselves in relation to their settings rather than with reference to a 
shared 'Palestinian' identity (Bowman 1994a); as Yezid Sayigh writes, "the equalizing impact 
of al-nakba had not so much destratified Palestinian society as disarticulated it" (Sayigh 1997: 
665). 
 Curiously, it was after the destruction of any shared 'Palestinian' existence that the 
idea of a Palestinian identity per se came into play (see Bowman 2002: 448-449 on identity as 
an attribute of exile). The focus of this identity - the emblem which gave it coherence - was 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation. This extra-territorial organisation had been 
established by the Arab League as a "gathering of traditional and influential notables" 
(Brand 1988: 28) capable of voicing Palestinian interests in the councils of the League, but the 
debacle of the 1967 war - during which the rest of what had been Mandate Palestine was lost 
to Israel and another 200,000 Palestinians were forced into exile - put paid to the illusion that 
Palestine could be redeemed by other Arab states.  Fatah, a political-commando group 
which had initially come together to resist Israel's occupation of Gaza during the Suez Crisis 
(Brand 1988: 26; see also Cobban 1984 and Gresh 1985 on the origins of the PLO), 'hijacked' 
the PLO and transformed it into a guerilla organisation dedicated to military attacks on the 
State of Israel and its allies. As such, the PLO could stand for Palestinians in exile and under 
occupation as a representation of their own desires to fight back against the forces which 
had dispossessed them (Sayigh 1997: 668-673). For the first time there was an objective 
correlate to Palestinians' disparate desires for restitution.  
 The fundamental reason the PLO was able to serve as an icon of Palestinian identity 
was that it presented itself as representative of all of the diverse 'Palestinian' constituencies 
disinherited by the creation of the Israeli state. 'Palestinians' could recognise themselves as 
  
addressed by the oppositional rhetoric of the PLO insofar as that rhetoric did not attribute 
any identity to its addressees other than that of having been stripped of their birthrights by 
the antagonism of the 'Zionist entity'. The PLO's programme was solely that of reinstituting 
a Palestinian national entity on the territory of Mandate Palestine - it made no effort to 
articulate the nature of that future entity save to say that it would be 'Palestinian'. 
Representing the 'Palestine' the PLO promised to redeem would have been difficult insofar 
as any accurate evocation of communal life before Zionist colonization would have recalled 
the inter-communal conflicts which had helped to bring about Palestinian dispossession (cf. 
Shyrock 1997). Furthermore, the nation which had lost 'its' territory had not existed before 
the land's expropriation. The lost homeland could only be conjured through imagining a 
space in which the Palestinian people would have lived as a community if the enemy whose 
violence had created that community had not existed.  
 This is not to imply that Palestinians had forgotten individual and social life before 
1948; Ben-Ze'ev (2000) and Slyomovics (1998) clearly demonstrate that Palestinians today 
treasure narratives of personal, familial and local lives before the Nakbah. Ben Ze'ev, 
however, contends that there is a radical incommensurability between the narratives of 
individuals remembering what life was like before their displacement and political 
discourses which represent a collective Palestinian identity before 1948. She shows that the 
latter mute the former, effacing details and translating the particularities of lived experience 
into political allegory; "within the national context the villagers were expected to conform to 
'the process of ironing out the specific details of an event, to make it general to the whole 
population'" (Ben-Ze'ev 2000: 290-291, citing Peters 1977: 72). Sa'di suggests, however, not a 
simple tension between individual and collective memories (in which the personal is left 
intact but subordinated to an "urge to tell the 'national story'" [Ben-Ze'ev: 291]) but a 
  
traumatic rupture profoundly scarring personal and social being:  
"Al-Nakbah is the violent moment which also created an unbridgeable break 
between the past and the present. It represents an end to normality...at both 
the individual and collective levels...Al-Nakbah represents a decisive breaking 
point between two qualitatively different realities, with different rules that 
govern before and after" (Sa'di 2002: 186 and 195).  
Its violence created the Palestinians - individually and collectively - as a people marked by 
"obsessive preoccupation with the past; a constant dealing with speculative questions such 
as what would have happened if...?; and, a struggle to return to normality" (Sa'di 2002: 186).  
 The PLO provided a space of identification for all those who felt their lives had been 
violated, disrupted and displaced as a result of Zionism's successes by presenting its project 
as the inverse of that of the Zionist state builders. People could see in the PLO's project the 
negation of the negation which had opened them to the various violences which afflicted 
them. In this national imaginary all Palestinians were 'the same' insofar as all of them could 
recognise their true selves as mutilated and denied by the violence of the Zionist enemy (cf. 
Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 129-130, and Bauman 1989: 26-27). Nevertheless, Palestinians in the 
various locales of their dispossession experienced the impossibility of Palestinian identity in 
diverse ways and the particular forms of violence through which Zionism's generalised 
antagonism was manifested led Palestinians in various sites to elaborate strategies of 
survival and resistance specific to those violences (Bowman 1993b and 1994a). The strategies 
of the fedayeen (guerillas) of the Middle Eastern refugee camps differed in method and 
motive as substantially from those of the samidin (those who 'stood fast' on the land) of the 
Occupied Territories as they did from those of the bureaucrats, businessmen and 
cosmopolitan intellectuals of the urban diaspora. All worked to 'negate' the activities of the 
  
enemy and its allies, but the forms of negation (from terroristic 'erasure' through passive 
resistance to intellectual and diplomatic revisionism) were formed in response to the 
specificities of the violences their formulators encountered. The PLO subsidised and 
supported this diversity of communities and maintained their respective organisations (see 
Cobban 1984: 26 and Bowman 1994a: 147) and was thus able to claim a wide range of 
'defensive' responses to Zionism as its own. Thus the actions of each community and its 
representative organisations answered to respective needs to resist specific antagonisms 
while serving, for other communities in different situations, as signs of a generalised 
Palestinian resistance to the enemies of Palestine. Dispersion meant that the actions each 
group carried out did not, in any immediate way, interfere with the interests of other 
groups.  
 Concrete moves towards a settlement with Israel effected by the success of the first 
intifada shattered that general consensus by bringing into view the possibility of an actual 
state of Palestine. During their long their exile, Palestinians had diversely imagined what 
their nation would be if the antagonisms which prevented it were to disappear. Whatever 
the specificities of these redemption images, every Palestinian saw a place for himself or 
herself in a 'reborn' state of Palestine. As the project of Palestinian positivity appeared to 
near fruition, however, the abstract concept of 'Palestine' began to take on discernable form 
in the shape of a 'statelet' in the rump of what had been Mandate Palestine. PLO 
negotiations with the Israeli state over which territories would be 'Palestinian' and which 
permanently surrendered to Israel left many Palestinians from the diaspora and the 
territories feeling betrayed. A prominent diasporic spokesman has accused the PLO of 
betraying "the diaspora Palestinians, who originally brought Arafat and the PLO to power, 
kept them there, and are now relegated to permanent exile or refugee status" (Said 1993: 5). 
  
Others within the Israeli-Occupied Territories who had been crippled by Israeli 'rubber 
bullets' or had seen friends and family members die fighting for Palestinian freedom came to 
believe that they, and the country they suffered to bring into being, was being sold out by 
the leadership and felt (at least until the recent outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada) that Arafat's 
'returning' cadres were doing little more than policing the Palestinian population for the 
Israeli state (Usher 1995: 61-83, Bowman 1999: 73-75). For them one set of occupiers had 
simply been replaced by another; the occupation, in effect, continued . 
 When the boundary dividing the antagonist from the objects of its violence breaks 
down, consensus on identity discursively structured around that antagonism loses its 
coherence. The wide field of Palestinian experience had been 'fixed' by an antagonism which 
made the various experiences of those who occupied it coherent in nationalist terms. When 
perceptions of the nature of that antagonism were transformed by the Oslo agreement and 
what followed, various occupants of the formerly 'sutured' field found that enemies had 
become allies while others discovered that former allies were now antagonists. Between 
Oslo and 28 September 2000 (when Ariel Sharon sparked the al-Aqsa intifada by 'visiting' the 
Haram al-Sharif or Temple Mount with a substantial armed guard) those in and affiliated 
with the PNA in large part acted as though the antagonism with Israel had ended. They 
operated a new and differentiated social mechanism they believed would generate a state of 
Palestine alongside of and working with the state of Israel. Simultaneously others, in the 
Occupied Territories and the Palestinian diaspora, saw them as traitors collaborating with 
the still virulent antagonist. 
 
The Genesis of 'Former Yugoslavia' (1918 - 1992) 
 In the Palestinian instance we have seen how the violence of an other prompts both 
  
the 'invention' of a national identity and the articulation of a national politics capable of 
promoting that identity; in the instance of Former Yugoslavia we can observe how the 
politics of an already established state are discursively transformed through the elaboration 
and promulgation of stories of the violence of 'others' previously perceived as neighbours. 
* * * 
 The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) was an explicitly 
anti-nationalist state formed in response to the crises nationalisms had forced on Yugoslavia 
before and during the Second World War. Between December 1918 and the Nazi invasion of 
April 1941, an earlier 'Yugoslavia' - known as "The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" - 
had brought Slovenes, Croats and Serbs together within a single state. This formation was 
highly unstable; the three narods ('nations' or 'peoples') who joined to create it had different 
and in large part incompatible reasons for uniting. Slovenes wanted a state guaranteeing 
political autonomy to Slovene-speakers formerly under the Austro-Hungarian Empire; 
Croats wanted self-determination for Croat-speaking Catholics entailing independence from 
that same empire and protection from the expansionist nationalism of their Hungarian 
neighbours; Serbs wanted all Serbs - especially those living outside the borders of the 
Serbian kingdom established after Ottoman dominion was overthrown in 1867 - to enjoy 
union under a single stateiv. The kingdom's twenty-three years were scored with 
assassinations, coups and the violences of nationalist movements fighting to seize the state 
for their own respective peoples, but the union survived until the Nazis broke up 
Yugoslavia, diversely promoting incompatible national aspirations within the fragments. 
Slovenia and the Dalmatian coast were ceded to Italy which attempted to integrate them by 
promoting fascism in lieu of nationalism (Clissold 1968: 209), but in the 'Independent State 
of Croatia' the German administration promoted the vicious nationalism of Ante Paveli 's 
  
anti-Serb and anti-Jewish Ustaša while in Serbia it bolstered a loose confederation of Serbian 
nationalists led by Milan Nedi  and Dimitrije Ljoti . The consequences were dire: massive 
numbers of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies and Croat communists and democrats were brutally 
slaughtered in Ustaša-operated death camps; within which; Ustaša and  etnici ('Chetniks') 
respectively massacred Serbian and Muslim civilians; and the anti-Nazi communist 
partisans 'executed' thousands of 'Chetnik' Serbs and Croat and Slovene 'traitors': 
"During the Second World War the conquerors not only destroyed the state, 
but they set its components against each other in an unprecedented way, for 
never before had there been physical conflict among the Yugoslav peoples as 
such" (Pavlowitch 1988: 14).  
At least 1,014,000 of a pre-war population of 17,186,000 were killed with eighty percent of 
deaths inflicted by Yugoslavs (Bana  1992: 18, Garde 1992 and Allcock 2000: 157-159). 
 Tito, who had mobilised wartime resistance through "a National Liberation 
Anti-Fascist Front of all the peoples of Yugoslavia regardless of party or religion" (Clissold 
1966: 216), continued to promote bratstvo i jedinstvo ('brotherhood and unity') in the post-war 
period. When Tito first used the phrase in 1942 it was not simply 'brotherhood and unity' 
but 'armed brotherhood and unity' (Godina 1998), and throughout his long rule Tito stressed 
that the space of Yugoslav federation was a good space endangered by an antagonistic 
outside. That the border between inside and outside was Titoism's essential ideological 
plank is made clear by the fact that, as in Orwell's 1984, the external threat continuously 
shifted its character and its source. After the initial opposition to fascism which gave the 
partisans power, Tito oscillated over the years between emphasising "the Soviet threat" and 
the threat of "the capitalist West" (Auty 1966: 247). While the interests of the state - and of 
the various peoples who constituted it - were always presented as threatened by the 
  
conspiracies of a labile set of enemies located outside Yugoslavia's territorial, and ideological, 
borders (Pavlowitch 1988: 22-25), there was no indeterminacy about what threatened 
Yugoslavia from within. Nationalism provided internal evidence of the attempts of external 
enemies to subvert the integrity of the federal space; it was a symptom of what the 
deconstructivists refer to as a "constitutive outside" (see Derrida 1974: 39-44 and Staten 1985: 
16-19). 
 Communist policy, within Yugoslavia and outside, did not outlaw national identity; 
it kept the 'nation' alive as an identity category at the same time as it worked to disarm its 
political power (Verderey 1991 and 1996) . The federal state protected the rights of narods 
(nations) and narodnosti (national minorities), but saw nationalism as a malignity through 
which "one society aspires to dominate, exploit or despoil the others" (Ramet 1992: 55). 
Titoism strove, through differential policies of appropriation and distribution of resources, 
to lift the poorer republics up to the economic level of the wealthier ones. It worked to 
dissolve nationalist aspirations through simultaneously devolving economic power to the 
community level - where worker's collectives would cohere around desires for mutual 
economic betterment (see Simmie 1991 on self-management) - and breaking up the political 
and economic power blocs of the dominant 'republics' (particularly Serbia) by creating new 
nationalities (such as the 'Macedonians', 'Montenegrins' and 'Muslims' enshrined in the 1974 
constitution - see Allcock 1992: 278-283) and devolving authority to autonomous regions 
such as Vojvodina and Kosovo.  
 The system could only work "as long as the communist system in Yugoslavia 
retained its revolutionary dynamic, or was perceived to be imperilled from without" (Shoup 
1992: 52). In the 1980s - with Tito's death and the collapse of the Yugoslav economy - that 
dynamic collapsed and the external threat which consolidated the inside came to be 
  
interpreted as the threat of the state's policies to the good interior of the nations themselves. 
In the popular imagination Tito had been "a symbol of a Yugoslav style that had less to do 
with socialism, self-management and non-alignment than with freedom of movement, the 
advent of the consumer society, and fending for oneself" (Pavlowitch 1988: 27). His death 
coincided with the collapse of the debt-ridden economy which had artificially maintained 
that style of living. International debts were called in and harsh IMF policies imposed in the 
early eighties, and by 1984 unemployment had surged to fifteen percent, inflation was 
topping sixty two percent and the standard of living had dropped thirty percent from its 
1980 level (see Pavlowitch 1988: 31 and Mencinger 1991: 76-79). The declining standard of 
living afflicted all Yugoslavs while increasingly clumsy moves by state agencies (particularly 
the Yugoslav National army [JNA]) to enforce cultural and economic homogeneity seemed 
to people, regardless of ethnic affiliation, as attacks on their ways of life (Ramet 1996 and 
Monroe 1999). A wide range of assertions - expressed in idioms ranging from the economic 
and political to those of art and culture (Mastnak 1991) - began to be heard, articulating the 
antagonism of the state to the people.  
 These expressions did not fall 'naturally' into nationalist idioms; citizens had to learn 
to which people they belonged. Tito's anti-nationalist policies and the modernization 
processes which had accompanied them had, to a large extent, submerged the idiom of 
national identity beneath a flood of contending discourses on selfhood. His 'invention' of 
nationalities had succeeded in dispersing identities across a wider national field than had 
operated before 1945 (see Duijzings 2000 on the 'identity play' of Yugoslavian censuses) 
while the ethnic isolation characteristic of rural Yugoslavia prior to the foundation of the 
communist state had in large part been dispelled by rural migration to the cities and by 
gasterbeiter work outside Yugoslavia (Pavlowitch 1988: 22, Allcock 2000: 161-165). A 
  
trans-Yugoslav cosmopolitanism had developed in the cities around work, education and 
cross-marriage (Cottrell 1990).  
 It was through the often accidental interaction of the ploys and assertions of a 
congeries of diverse interest groups that nationalist discourse emerged. Politicians, 
intellectuals, priests and media figures struggled - ofttimes against each other - to invent 
platforms from whence they could launch bids to increase their privileges and powers in a 
state characterised, after the death of Tito, by a vacuum at the centre (Silber and Little 1995: 
29-97, Lampe 1996: 325-356). An audience - 'the people' - had to be conjured to address from 
these platforms, and, as Serbia illustrates, this production involved not only the elaboration 
of themes of internal and external enemies whose antagonisms defined the people but also 
viscerally powerful stories of victimization which allowed them to recognise themselves in 
the torments of others.  
 Jasna Dragovi -Soso's recent 'Saviours of the Nation': Serbia's Intellectual Opposition 
and the Revival of Nationalism demonstrates the way apparently incompatible strategies 
interacted to fertilize a 'Serbian' discourse on national interests threatened by an antagonistic 
other. The theme of out-migration from Kosovo of Kosovar Serbs was variously elaborated 
after the eruption, in Prishtina in March 1981, of a number of anti-Belgrade demonstrations. 
While dissident intellectuals used Kosovo as a launchpad for attacks on state policies 
repressing minority rights and freedom of speech (Dragovi -Soso 2002: 121), other interest 
groups - in particular the Serbian Orthodox clergy and the 'new historiographers' (able, after 
the breakdown of official historiography, to speak 'silenced' histories [see Dragovi -Soso 
2002: 65-77]) - focussed on the plight of the Kosovar Serbs as emblematic of the situation of 
Yugoslav Serbs in general. The confluence of these antithetical discourses - some attacking 
the state for promoting nationalism and others attacking it for not protecting the interests of 
  
a national community - produced Kosovar Serbs as personfications of victimage, and the 
Kosovar Albanians (with the federal state behind them) as a malignant cabal.  
 From 1985 on a series of publications "pour[ed] from the printing presses of 
Belgrade... presenting the whole history of the Serbs as an unending chronicle of ethnic 
martyrdom" (Malcolm 1998: 338). These texts, widely reviewed in a fervent popular press, 
lamented the 'loss' of the Serbian homeland and its magnificent monasteries to the 'invading' 
Albanians (emotively equated with the Ottoman Turks who had defeated a 'Serb' army and 
conquered Kosovo in 1389 [Darby 1966: 96-102, Malcolm 1999: 58-80]) and graphically 
corporealized the Kosovar assault on the 'body' of Serbia. Albanians were said not only to 
rape Serbian girls in their houses and Serbian nuns in their monasteries but also to drive 
Serb families from their homes (taken over to house the fast-breeding Kosovar population as 
well as the illegal Albanian immigrants the regional government encouraged [Salecl 1993: 
79-81]) and desecrate and raze Orthodox churches and monasteries so they could be 
replaced by mosques.  
 Such stories of antagonism to the intimate spaces - family and religion - of Serbian 
life were received with morbid fascination in the atmosphere of disquiet and anxiety 
generated by the collapsing of the order which had stabilized the Yugoslav system and its 
structures of expectation for the previous half century. One story which spoke to mass 
audiences (I heard it again in 1999 as legitimation for the war in Kosovo) was that of Djordje 
Martinovi  who, on 1 May 1985, was treated in a Prishtina hospital for severe lacerations 
caused when a beer bottle inserted in his anus had broken (see Cvii  1993, Malcolm 1998: 
338-340, Bracewell 2000 and Dragovi -Soso 2002: 132-134). Although doctors and an official 
investigative team reported that Martinovi  had injured himself while masturbating, he 
claimed two masked Albanians had attacked him while he was working on his farm. The 
  
story, originally published in the Belgrade political weekly NIN, was twice debated in the 
Yugoslav Federal assembly (July 1985 and February 1986) and a 485 page hardback, Slu aj 
Martinovi  (The Martinovi  Case), elaborating the case and its implications quickly sold out 
despite an unprecedented initial print run of 50,000 copies (Malcolm 1998: 338). Two 
hundred prominent Belgrade intellectuals signed a petition, submitted to both republican 
and federal assemblies on 21 January 1986, claiming that  
"The case of Djordje Martinovi  has become that of the whole Serb nation in 
Kosovo. Even among crimes it would be hard to find a crime like this; but the 
fact that the entire legal-constitutional order of a country has been harnessed 
to hide such a crime is surely without precedent. The enemy is being 
encouraged" (quoted in Magas: 1993: 51). 
The notorious Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts - which, after being 
leaked to the press in September 1986, served as a clarion call to the Serb nation - cited the 
Martinovi  case amongst other evidence of "the physical, political, juridical and cultural 
genocide" of the Kosovar Serbs as being particularly evocative of "the blackest periods of 
Turkish impalings" (quoted in Malcolm 1998: 340).  
 This rhetoric effectively suggested that Albanians 'inside' Serbia made it impossible 
for Serbian individuals to live - as Serbs or at all - on Serbian ground; it also suggested that 
Kosovar Albanian attempts to mutilate or eradicate the Serbian presence in Kosovo were 
only successful because - intentionally or because of the structure of the federal government 
- they were assisted by the Yugoslav state. Slobodan Miloševi , whose initial rise from 
director of Technogas, the state fuel company, to chief of the Serbian Communist party had 
depended on the patronage of Ivan Stamboli  (for whose murder he has recently been 
arraigned), forged a more powerful support for his ambition in welding these two 
  
antagonisms into a single anti-Serb bloc. At Kosovo Polje, on the 24th of April 1987, he told 
an angry crowd of Kosovar Serbs whose anti-Albanian demonstration was being broken up 
by baton-wielding policemen that "no one should dare to beat you" (see Silber and Little 
1995: 36-39). Although Miroslav Šolevi , one of the demonstration's organisers, 
subsequently joked that Milosevi  - an apparatchik who had previously been neither 
nationalistic nor interested in Kosovo - had addressed the police rather than the 
demonstrators (Ibid: 37), Milosevi 's promotion of himself as a political figure willing to 
speak (in front of television cameras) for Kosovar Serbs against both the Albanians and the 
state police "turned him into a 'national leader', a role which enabled him to quell all 
opposition to his takeover of the Communist Party machine" (Malcolm 1999: 342).  
  Miloševi  legitimated 'Serbia' as a locus of identity and 'Serbian interests' as a focus 
of concern. Kosovars were, however, only the internal agents of an external enemy. Their 
assault against Serbia and Serbians was, according to Miloševi , backed by a 
'Vatican-Comintern conspiracy' (Ramet 1992: 230) which linked the communist state (which 
had 'stolen' the Serbian homeland of Kosovo from Serbia) with the Catholic Church (which 
was said to have sponsored the Ustaša)v. Deftly linking an historical experience of 
antagonism with the current situation, Miloševi  characterised 'his' struggle to save Kosovo 
for Serbs as another "battle for Kosovo [which]...we shall win despite the fact that Serbia's 
enemies outside the country are plotting against it, along with those in the country" (speech 
given by Miloševi  on 19 November 1988, quoted in Ramet 1992: 230). By reminding Serbs 
of the Greater Serbia which had been 'stolen' by the nation's enemies, Miloševi  legitimated 
and popularised his drive to 'recover' Serbia by stripping Montenegro and Macedonia of 
their republican independence and outlawing the autonomy of the Vojvodina (these regions, 
like Kosovo, were parts of the Serbia Tito had dismembered in his anti-nationalism project - 
  
see Aspeslagh 1992, Canak 1993, Cegorovic 1993, and Poulton 1991: 39-56). Through the 
evocation of the nation's loss and the people's enemies Miloševi  constituted a Serbian 
positivity - a repertoire of Serbian traditions and an agenda of Serbian aspirations grounded 
in a former wholeness - and garnered mass support from people who found indicators of the 
real causes of their sufferings and directions on their eradication in his words (cf. Gordy 
1999 and Thomas 1999).  
 Miloševi 's rise to power coincided with the mobilisation, in Slovenia and Croatia, 
of 'democratic oppositions' contending for republican power in the first Yugoslav 
multi-party elections. The ground for nationalist opposition in Slovenia had already been 
prepared in the previous decade by clumsy attempts by the Yugoslav state, through the 
agency of the JNA, to bring this wealthiest and most liberal of the Yugoslav republics under 
control. Generalized impressions of relative deprivation and persecution had been focussed, 
in March 1988, by the prosecution of the 'Ljubljana Four' - three journalists of the Slovene 
socialist youth paper,  Mladina, and a source - for publishing a leaked JNA report 
hypothetically detailing preparations for the imposition of martial law. Their trial, which 
took place in Ljubljana, was held in camera, without defense lawyers and in Serbo-Croatian 
rather than Slovene (see Silber and Little 1995: 50-59). "What began as a case of 'the state 
versus the press' turned into a case of 'the Federation versus the Slovene Republic" (Magas 
1993: 116). When, in the spring of 1990, elections for republican offices were called and 
candidates were invited from outside the echelons of the Communist Party, a number of 
oppositional parties announced platforms signally lacking in policy statements and heavily 
imbued with highly nationalist rhetorics declaring - in effect - that the communist state was 
destroying the Slovene nation. In March 1990 I saw in Ljubljana campaign booths bedecked 
with pictures of caves (foibe) filled with the bones of persons massacred by partisans at the 
  
close of the Second World War as they fled the victorious communists' advance. Although 
the victims were ethnically and politically mixed (Ustaša,  etnici, Slovene collaborators, and 
their families and camp followers as well as civilians of all ethnicities caught up in the 
panicked retreat), the captions on the photographs said simply "This is what They did to Us". 
All three of the signifiers - 'this', 'they' and 'us' - were left open as were the connectives 
which linked those signifiers of persons and activities in the past to persons and practices in 
the present. The ambiguity of the message served, if anything, to make it clearer and its 
audience broader (cf. Paine 1981: 13-18 and Parkin 1984: 353-354 on enthymeme); the people, 
as Slovenes, were called to recognise communist violence towards Slovenes in the past as 
the same as the state's activities towards them in the present. The message - 'just as the 
communists killed Slovenes en masse as they came to power, so too have subsequent 
communist state policies continued national genocide by other means' - barely needed 
elaboration. The nation, neither defined, described, nor qualified, was here constituted as a 
good thing because the enemy wished to deny it to the people. Slovenia, which had never 
previously moved to establish itself as an independent state, henceforth committed itself to a 
programme of nationalist realisation. 
 In Croatia Franjo Tudjman's Christian Democratic Community party (the HDZ) also 
paraded pictures of bone piles, asserting these were not the skeletons of 'Nazis' or 'quislings' 
but of 'Croatian victims' of communist brutality. Tudjman, however, in constituting a 
nationalist position for Croatian identification, drew upon a more salient articulation of the 
'us' which opposed the communist 'other'. Croatia had had a recent national positivity which 
had been destroyed by the communist state, and Tudjman reclaimed the quisling Ustaša 
'Independent State of Croatia' as an "expression of the historical aspiration of the Croatian 
people for its own independent state" (Tudjman, 1990, quoted in Denich 1994: 6). Tudjman 
  
and the ideologues of the HDZ  campaigned for the republican leadership (and later for 
Croatian independence) with the - not inaccurate - assertion that the Yugoslav state had 
existed to prevent Croatians from enjoying their nationhood. The sufferings of 
contemporary Croats was a result of a long campaign by the Yugoslav state to unjustly 
‘punish’ the Croatian people for their previous attempt to realise themselves as a nation.  
 Yugoslavia was not, however, simply a state opposed to nationalism but a 
Serb-dominated state organised to destroy the Serb's national enemies, the Croats. To fight 
back against Serbian ‘aggression’ against the Croatian people Tudjman and the HDZ  
adopted the same anti-Serbian rhetorics and programmes their Ustaša predecessors had 
utilised to defeat the ‘Serbian threat’.The HDZ programme called for an independent 
Croatia expanded to Croatia's 'historical borders' (the Ustaša state borders, encompassing 
most of Bosnia-Herçegovina) flying a national flag on which the red star of Yugoslavia was 
replaced by the 'chessboard' pattern (šahovnica) which had graced the flag of 'Independent 
State of Croatia'. The language - Croatian - would be purged of the 'pollution' of Serbian 
words. 
 The HDZ 's nationalist programme, articulated almost exclusively in anti-Serbian 
terms, panicked the Serbs of the Krajina who saw in the resurgence of the gestures and 
policies of the Ustaša a threat to inflict on them a genocide analogous to that they had 
suffered in the war. They too had their bone cachesvi. Krajina Serbs invited local and Serbian 
journalists and photographers into caves where the skeletons of Serbs massacred by Ustaša 
had been cached. These monuments to the fate of Croatian Serbs under the Ustaša 
functioned locally to legitimate resistance to the new Croatian order and attempts to 
constitute a Serbian mini-state. In Serbia the fate of the Krajina Serbs under Ante Paveli  
was obsessively recounted (after 45 years of official silencing):  
  
"genocide became a central theme in the media, and particularly in the yellow 
press, using explosive language, vast generalisations and reproducing 
photographs from the war showing dead and mutilated bodies for full shock 
effect" (Dragovi -Soso 2002: 113).  
I remember multi-volumed texts, opened to grainy photographs of multilation and torture, 
displayed in Belgrade bookshops windows in the spring of 1991 (among them Milan 
Bulaji 's four-volumed Ustaški zlo in genocida, which argued that in Jasenovac, but one of 
their several concentration camps, the Ustaša exterminated 1,700,000 persons). Denich 
suggests that the consequent ethnic hatred of Croats by Serbs in Serbia was based on 
identification with these images and narratives rather than on historical memory:  
while the rebellions of Serbian communities in Croatia were motivated by 
their own memories of the Ustasha regime, now eerily reincarnated in the 
declarations and symbols of the new nationalist government...the inhabitants 
of Serbia itself had not experienced the Ustasha terror, and their wartime 
suffering had come at the hands of the Germans and other foreign occupiers, 
rather than Croats (Denich 1991: 11). 
Serbs in Serbia, already inflamed by tales of the violence inflicted on fellow Serbs within the 
borders of the Serbian republic, were now offered - in the form of horrific stories from the 
past - evidence of what future fate ethnic enemies had in store for the Serbian people outside. 
Miloševi 's apocalyptic rhetoric of 1988 about the Albanian threat to a Serbian presence in 
Kosovo ("the latest genocide of the twenty-first century" [quoted in Dragovic-Soso 2002: 211]) 
made it possible for Serbs to think in terms of a Serbian homeland (albeit one made palpable 
only through the evocation of its loss); the conjuring of the atrocities Krajina Serbs would 
suffer at the hands of the reincarnated Ustaša enabled Serbs to imagine, through the 
  
evocation of that people's extermination, a Greater Serbia unifying the 'Serbian people'. 
 Benedict Anderson, describing the process of ‘imagining community’, posits that one 
imagines one’s own situation (as, for instance, a newspaper reader) reproduced in that of 
thousands - or millions - of others. One is able, through that imaginative extension, to 
conceive of a nation of others ‘like oneself’ (see Anderson 1991: 35-36). In the Yugoslav 
republics the imagining of community came about instead through imagining oneself as like 
others. Audiences, addressed in terms marked as ‘ethnic’ by diacritics of language, script, 
cultural and historical reference or site of address, were ‘interpellated’ into national subject 
positions by their recognition they were being addressed (see Althusser 1971: 152-165). The 
addressee was then ‘worked on’ by narratives focussing diffuse and oftimes inchoate 
anxieties upon powerful and graphic images of violences inflicted by the members of other 
communities on the bodies and properties of fellow ‘Serbs’, ‘Croats’ or ‘Slovenes’. Here the 
violences the addressee encountered in his or her life are equated with those the national 
enemy inflicted on the bodies of the tormented objects of the discourse. Recognition that 
one’s own apparently minor sufferings were in fact premonitions of the greater violence the 
enemy intended to inflict on all who shared one’s national identity impelled the addressee to 
join defensively in inflicting violence on that other under the charismatic leadership of 
politicians who ‘recognised’ the real nature of past and present violences.  
 
Conclusion: Not a Model but a Chart of Forces 
 The two case studies recounted above differ significantly. Most obviously, while the 
sophistication of the Yugoslav media (developed under the aegis of the Yugoslav state) 
meant narratives of antagonism and identity circulated with relative ease in forms accessible 
not only to a wide public but also to subsequent academic recall, the powerful forces 
  
working to prevent the emergence of a Palestinian entity ensured that - except during brief 
interludes - Palestinian narratives have travelled covertly by word of mouth, graffiti, 
broadsheets, illegal video and audio tapes and the friable likevii. However, in addition to 
differences between what people identify through there are also significant differences 
between what they can identify with. Communist policy in the Socialist Federative Republic 
of Yugoslavia had, through its nationalities policies, promoted markers of national 
difference even while attempting to empty them of significant content. When communist 
hegemony began to collapse, anti-statist feelings could be channelled without difficulty into 
those containers which - though filling with national imaginings differing to greater or lesser 
degrees from earlier formulations - remained nominally the same. Charges of attempted 
"nation theft" (see ði〉 ek 1990) against the enemies of the people were not so easily levied in 
the Palestinian instance. There the violences involved in the establishment and consolidation 
of the Israeli state were inflicted upon a diffuse and fragmented field of communities which 
lacked a unifying designator signalling national communality. Only with the emergence of 
the PLO was a Durkheimian "blank banner" (Ardener 1971: xliii-xlvi) raised which - evoking 
a Palestine denied - enabled Palestinians in various sites and states to imagine their 
differences subsumed within the programme of liberating 'Palestine'. Such banners of the 
nation, in Palestine as in the states replacing Yugoslavia, outlive the nationalist communality 
they putatively represent; once the nation is "baptized" (Kripke  1980) with the "rigid 
designator" (Ibid) of a name 'it' perdures, the name capable of standing for both the state 
hegemonic nationalist elites are establishing and, in the eyes of those dissatisfied with and 
disenfranchised from the emergent order, for the hijacked nation still to be realized (cf. ði〉
ek 1989: 95-99). In contemporary Palestine Hamas and the Palestinian Authority both 
  
advocate the establishment of a state of 'Palestine', but because of their different imaginings 
of what that state will be and who it will represent they fight each other in pursuit of the 
'same' end. Similarly in today's Serbia populations and politicians are lethally divided over 
what 'Serbia' will prevail. 
 I claim, regardless of the differences between these two examples, that the 
foundation stones of nationalist imaginaries are 1) perceptions of antagonism and 2) the 
construction of defensive solidarity linking actual and potential victims of the antagonism's 
violence through identification. Despite this claim I do not propose a cross-cultural model to 
be analytically imposed on all instances of emergent nationalist identities (pace McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly 2001); the differences these two cases alone throw up demonstrate the 
impossibility of positing a fixed and universally discernable connexion between 
antagonisms and ways populations respond to them. We should instead conceive of the 
relationship between antagonism and identity as like that between objects which, impelled 
by quanta of force, collide. An antagonism strikes a community from its 'outside' (see Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985: 146, n. 20) and the damage to that community, as well as the resistance 
with which that community responds to the assault, depends not only on the degree of 
violence with which the antagonism has struck but also on the resources the assaulted 
community can muster in its defence. Palestinians, subjected in the early part of the last 
century to a well-funded and co-ordinated nationalist movement intent on expropriating 
Palestine for itself, had few commensurate resources available with which to respond, and 
the length of time it has taken them to mobilize a powerful counterforce is indicative of the 
work of self-invention, organization and alliance they have had to carry out to mount what 
may in time prove a successful resistance (cf. Chatterjee 1986 on the staged development of 
anti-colonial resistance in India). The Ex-Yugoslav republics not only had well-established 
  
communicative and military systems but also communalist identities which could be turned 
with little difficulty from latent fraternalism towards overt fratricide. Developed 
international connections were able to serve as powerful tools of resistance and aggression. 
Social trauma, triggered by the collapse of the Titoist system, rapidly voiced itself in 
nationalist identity assertions which, amplified by the media and politicians, were 
interpreted as antagonistic by neighbouring republics. The speed with which the various 
republics were able to consolidate collective nationalist solidarity (Bosnia-Herçegovina was 
an exception) and launch brutal wars against 'the other' surprised a world which had not 
thought a thoroughly modernised secular state could plunge so quickly into ethnocide.  
 Common to these cases, and to other articulations of nationalist movements, is the 
perception - 'real' or illusory (but nonetheless effective) - of an enemy's violence driving 
those endangered by that exterminative threat into defensive solidarity (cf. Rabinowitz 1997). 
Without perception of that 'constitutive violence' identities - 'national' or 'ethnic' - remain 
mere markers of communities' actual or intended engagement in the workings of 
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Precis: this paper examines the processes through which nationalist movements developed 
among both the Palestinian people and those national communities which made up the late 
Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia so as to examine the role played by 'antagonism' 
in what the paper terms the 'nationalist imaginary'. Fundamental to the text's respective 
analyses of nation formation and state dissolution is the concept that the imagined violence 
of a national enemy is at the core of the 'defensive' mobilisations we call nationalisms. It 
posits that the 'inside' of identity formation is not only shaped by but also grounded on the 
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